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Abstract 
Models explaining populism as a policy response to the interests of the urban poor struggle to understand the 
instability of populist mobilisations. A focus on political theatre is more helpful. This article extends the debate 
on populist performance, showing how populists typically do not produce rehearsed performances to passive 
audiences. In drawing ‘the people’ on stage they are forced to improvise. As a result, populist performances are 
rarely sustained. The article describes the Zambian Patriotic Front’s (PF) theatrical insurrection in 2006 and its 
evolution over the next decade. The PF’s populist aspect had faded by 2008 and gradually disappeared in 
parallel with its leader Michael Sata’s ill-health and eventual death in 2014. The party was nonetheless electorally 
successful. The article accounts for this evolution and describes a ‘post-populist’ legacy featuring hyper-
partisanship, violence and authoritarianism. Intolerance was justified in the populist moment as a reflection of 
anger at inequality; it now floats free of any programme. 
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Introduction 
This article both contributes to the thin theoretic literature on ‘post-populism’ and develops an 
illustrative case. It discusses the explosive arrival of the Patriotic Front (PF) on the Zambian 
electoral scene in 2006 and the party’s subsequent evolution. It examines how the PF has been 
framed as populist by authors emphasising the policy orientation of rational actors operating in a 
political marketplace, and argues that this framing stretches the concept beyond usefulness. It 
suggests that the PF’s 2006 campaign can more sensibly be described as populist on the basis that it 
used political theatre to construct antagonistic social identities. It thus extends Benjamin Moffitt’s 
(2016) analysis of populism as political theatre by showing that populism often draws its audience, 
‘the people’ on stage. The resulting necessary improvisation of a leader’s performance can sharpen 
contradictions inherent in populist mobilisations: theatrical illusions are difficult to sustain. This 
helps explain the party’s inability to institutionalise, and its evolution from populism to 
authoritarianism. The article also highlights the extent to which the PF’s populism became untenable 
because it was bound up with the energetic and confrontational persona of the party’s founder, 
Michael Sata, a performance he struggled to sustain. 
While Sata won the presidency in 2011, and the PF retained power under Edgar Lungu, the article 
suggests that the party’s populism mellowed immediately after the 2006 campaign and then faded 
and disappeared in parallel with Sata’s ill-health and eventual death in 2014. This raises two 
questions: how did the party increase its vote share even as its populism faded, and what does this 
tell us about what comes after populist moments? The article directs attention to the ways Zambian 
political celebrities mobilise clientelist networks, which frequently switch parties en masse. These 
collective defections render implausible accounts of parties as outgrowths of citizens’ programmatic 
preferences, economic interests or ethnic identities. As the PF took over urban representative 
structures from 2006, and then won the presidency in 2011, contestation over the spoils of power 
generated resentments, defections and violent confrontations within and between parties. This 
turbulence reflected little more than the clashing ambitions of a set of political chameleons. The 
article concludes that Zambia now experiences a ‘post-populist’ legacy. Hyper-partisanship and 
violence, connected in the populist moment to unmet social needs, remain. An optimistic, future-
oriented project to meet those needs has dissipated, leaving popular cynicism and apathy and an 
insecure, authoritarian ruling party. 
A sketch of the PF’s history 
Independent since 1964, Zambia’s economy has been dominated by the export of a single 
commodity (copper), the price of which is unstable. A debt crisis in the 1980s empowered Zambia’s 
donors, whose influence supported domestic pressures for democratisation and economic 
liberalisation. After the peaceful departure of founding president Kenneth Kaunda and his United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
failed in its first decade to deliver prosperity. Frederick Chiluba, the MMD’s trade unionist leader, 
clung to power until 2001 by undermining democratic competition, demobilising the party’s urban 
and labour support base and managing clientelist networks centred on the presidency. 
Chiluba met his political end in the popular defeat of his bid for an unconstitutional third term. 
When Levy Mwanawasa was appointed as Chiluba’s successor, Michael Sata – a veteran politician 
with trade unionist roots similar to Chiluba’s – felt overlooked and left the MMD. He launched his 
own party, the PF, just before the 2001 elections. With little time to organise, it won few votes. 
Mwanawasa’s presidency saw comparatively fair multi-party competition. A liberalised media 
enabled diverse voices to be heard and increasing mobile phone ownership allowed politicians to 
build an unmediated dialogue with voters through call-in radio shows (Simutanyi et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, it was unclear that opposition parties could make much of these openings. Most 
challengers to the MMD since 1991 had been ‘big men’ who funded their own parties and used 
patronage rather than a programmatic appeal to stitch together regional voting blocs (Posner, 2005). 
Debt dependence also played a role in Zambia’s ‘choiceless democracy’ as opposition parties 
internalised IMF and World Bank policy preferences (Mkandawire, 1999). This is not to say that the 
MMD’s opponents would, without donor incentives, have been radical: the most significant leader, 
Anderson Mazoka of the United Party for National Development (UPND), was a former executive 
of mining multinational Anglo-American. Indeed, in the post-Cold War world, ideologically-
coherent, mass-based, democratic parties are in short supply globally. As Peter Mair puts it, politics 
had been ‘stripped of its popular component’ leaving ‘democracy without a demos’, in which, in 
terms of voters’ attitudes towards their representatives, the ‘dividing line between indifference and 
hostility is not always very pronounced’ (2006: 25). Zambia in the mid-2000s was in this sense ripe 
for change: its economy was depressed and unequal, its institutions and media left space for 
opposition, but a technocratic consensus reigned and no party or movement seemed capable of 
channelling popular frustrations. 
Shortly before the 2006 election, three factors shifted. In April 2005, Zambia satisfied its 
creditors’ demands and was granted US$3.9 billion of debt relief, weakening donors’ grip. A 
concurrent upswing in global copper prices re-awakened Zambia’s economy but windfall profits for 
mining multinationals drew attention to the unfavourable terms of the industry’s privatisation (Fraser 
and Lungu, 2007). Thirdly, in May 2006, UPND leader Mazoka died. His replacement, Hakainde 
Hichilema (like Mazoka, an ethnic Tonga businessman, known for his proximity to international 
capital) was chosen over Mazoka’s deputy Sakwiba Sikota, an ethnic Lozi. The UPND was labelled 
as a party captured by Tonga interests. In a country in which ‘tribalism’ is taboo, a gap opened for an 
alternative representative of the anti-MMD mood. 
Sata stepped into this context, emphasising a range of problems including urban disorder, 
inequality, precarious employment in the mines, corruption and the dependence of Mwanawasa’s 
administration on Western – and, increasingly, Chinese – sponsorship. The PF attracted a huge 
urban vote and almost won power in the 2006 elections. The pattern repeated in a 2008 presidential 
by-election after Mwanawasa’s death. Then in 2011, Sata finally won enough rural votes to add to his 
dominance of the urban electorate and take power. However, the PF had not won a parliamentary 
majority and, within months, adopted familiar methods to buy off opposition MPs. 
The sense of an administration struggling for control was exacerbated by the fact that, since 2008, 
Sata had been visibly ailing. As president, he disappeared as a public figure, seeming to have little 
energy to pursue a transformative agenda, let alone manage debilitating factionalism within his party. 
Sata died in office in late 2014. Violence surrounded the brutal competition to become the PF’s 
candidate to contest the resulting 2015 presidential by-election, revealing the limited 
institutionalisation of a party run as a vehicle for one man. Edgar Lungu took the PF nomination, 
narrowly defeated Hichilema’s UPND (the MMD imploded) and saw through the last 18 months of 
Sata’s term. The parties repeated similar vote shares in the August 2016 tripartite elections, which 
were marred by unprecedented political violence and repression of the independent media. An 
unsuccessful petition to Zambia’s Constitutional Court focused attention on the suspiciously narrow 
achievement of a new requirement to secure more than 50% of the vote to avoid a run-off (Fraser, 
2016). The administration then attracted international condemnation when it responded to the 
opposition leader’s refusal to accept Lungu’s legitimacy by incarcerating Hichilema on treason 
charges. 
The emergence of the UPND in 2001, of the PF after 2006, the implosion of the MMD after 
2011, and the resultant boiling down of a fragmented party system into close head-to-head 
confrontations between the PF and UPND in 2015 and 2016 can be seen in Figure 1 below. 
Rational actor models 
Since 2006 the PF has been categorised in a range of articles and books as ‘populist’ or ‘ethno-
populist’ and contrasted to the MMD (seen variously as liberal, technocratic and as an incumbent 
‘catch-all’ party), and the UPND (sometimes read as ethno-regional, sometimes as liberal). Most 
authors seek to explain the rise of the PF using a methodologically individualist model of politics, 
involving an electoral marketplace in which power-seeking politicians respond ‘rationally’ to public 
demand with promises to supply policy goods. 
Danielle Resnick (2013) identifies urbanisation and unemployment as the fuel for Sata’s rise. 
Inadequate infrastructure forced urban dwellers to take expensive journeys from under-serviced 
residential areas to insecure work in the informal sector. The difficulty of securing licenses to  
 
 Figure 1. Party vote shares in Zambian presidential elections, 1991–2016. 
Source: ECZ. 
 
trade or tenure over residences left street vendors and ‘squatter’ populations vulnerable in the face of 
politically connected protection rackets and hostile policing. Resnick describes the urban poor as 
unusually motivated to deploy their electoral capital to secure favourable policies. Despite their 
numerical dominance, she suggests that these voters had been unable to distinguish between the 
parties before 2006, and scattered their favours widely. Sata then emerged as a champion of the 
urban poor, amplifying their concerns. 
Resnick surveys a range of definitions of populism, which pay attention to clientelism and 
charisma (2013: 2, 11) and she describes Sata’s anti-elitist rhetoric and willingness to distribute goods 
as elements of his appeal (2013: 73–75). She also mentions aspects of political theatre, including his 
willingness to meet voters who visited PF headquarters, his use of bussed-in crowds at political 
rallies ‘to convince others that he has legitimacy as the people’s representative’ (2013: 76) and his 
humiliations of senior figures (even in his own party) to create ‘a paternal image that only he cared 
for the people’ (2013: 81). Nonetheless, these insights take second place to Resnick’s comparison of 
campaign pledges with survey data on urban residents’ concerns and voting choices. Resnick’s 
austere theoretical framework insists on identifying populism as a marketing strategy by which the 
PF differentiated itself, advertising ‘congruence’ between policy reforms and voters’ interests. 
Nic Cheeseman et al. (2015) work with a similar methodological toolkit but look for drivers of 
populism not so much in the class consciousness of informal workers as in the subjectivity of a 
‘populist constituency’. They suggest that, if populism is to be useful to social scientists, it ought to 
be definable in terms of a precise set of policies supported by populist voters. Assessing responses to 
Afrobarometer survey questions such as ‘Should the state control agricultural credit?’, they identify 
voter demand for intervention in economic policy as under-supplied. While recognising 
inconsistencies, they claim to be able to boil down Sata’s policies over a decade to two essentials: 
state intervention and hostility to foreign investment (2015: 344). Like Resnick, Cheeseman et al. 
gloss significant evolutions in the PF’s pitch to voters between 2006 and 2011. These explanations of 
‘populism’ as responsiveness to durable support for state intervention or frustration over persistently 
unmet social needs offer few tools to explain change. 
Cheeseman and Marja Hinfelaar’s (2009) analysis of the evolution of the PF between 2006 and 
2008 employs a better-equipped model. Drawing on Adrienne LeBas’s (2006) discussion of 
‘polarization as craft’, they argue that parties positioned themselves relative to competitors, and that 
the game evolved with each move. After Sata effectively politicised the terms of foreign investment 
and urban living standards during the 2006 campaign, the MMD tried to cut its losses in 2008 by 
adopting PF policies on taxing multinationals and poverty reduction. The PF responded by targeting 
middle class opinion formers, easing hostility towards donors, and welcoming debt relief and 
economic growth. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar describe this as a ‘remarkable process of re-invention’, 
in which Sata ‘sold himself as a member of the political establishment’, suggesting that to ‘make this 
new approach credible to Zambian voters’, he moved ‘the PF towards the centre ground’ (2009: 67). 
Given this reorientation, it is not clear why they still describe the PF as running an ‘ethno-populist’ 
campaign in 2008, falling back to a very thin definition in which any campaign partly focused on any 
policy (rather than simply ethnic appeals) qualifies as populist. 
The difficulty for analyses grounded in policy differentiation is that all Zambian parties have been 
exceptionally programmatically flexible. For example, the UPND (sometimes figured as liberal) and 
the PF (sometimes figured as statist) have each taken, at different moments since 2001, positions on 
mining ranging from advocating punitive taxation or nationalisation to proposing tax and regulatory 
cuts. Even during the PF’s populist moment in 2006, the party manifesto promised to ‘Maintain an 
open, liberal macro-economic environment’ (Patriotic Front, 2006: 26). Meanwhile, UPND 
newspaper advertisements proposed to ‘establish grain marketing boards’, ‘above all subsidise 
agricultural production’, and to establish co-operatives in a range of industries (UPND, 2006). As 
Cheeseman and Hinfelaar note, by 2008 the PF’s rhetoric was increasingly centrist. After taking 
power in 2011, the policy PF ministers worked hardest to sell (delighting Western donors) was 
cutting agricultural, fuel and food subsidies. The UPND criticised the resulting rising cost of living 
and promised to reverse subsidy cuts. As the 2016 election approached, UPND leader Hichilema 
became at times outlandishly interventionist, proposing to re-open the one-party era car factory in 
Livingstone and claiming, ‘we want to empower local transporters and so if there is a company from 
South Africa, Congo, Zimbabwe or Malawi that is transporting our maize, your days are numbered’ 
(Lusaka Times, 2016). Hichilema’s pitch at other moments was that he would run Zambia like a 
business. Among the party’s ten-point manifesto was one (populist?) pledge to tackle inequality, and 
other (neo-liberal?) promises to create jobs ‘by creating a supportive environment for business that 
promotes investment’, and to improve competitiveness by cutting red tape (UPND, 2016). 
The programmatic flexibility of Zambia’s parties is reflected in the ease with which politicians 
rotate among them and alliances between them are made and broken. UNIP, the MMD, UPND and 
PF all featured at their births politicians defecting from senior roles in other parties, and many have 
since continued to circulate. An extreme example is former president Rupiah Banda. When he won 
the MMD’s nomination in 2008, Banda was suspected of continuing to ground his influence in 
UNIP networks. The PF’s successful campaign in 2011 was largely built on a critique of his 
patrimonial modus operandi. Having lost the leadership of the MMD, Banda sought to retake it just 
before the 2015 elections. He failed, then endorsed the PF and is now figured as a leading influence. 
Offering policy differentiation as the factor that links voters to Zambian politicians or parties 
requires very selective readings of this kind of behaviour. 
Nonetheless, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar are right that something about the PF has consistently 
attracted urban voters. I have combined electoral commission and census data to identify 28 ‘urban’ 
constituencies among Zambia’s 150 parliamentary seats (these are defined as those in districts with a 
population density of over 100 persons per square kilometre). In 2006, the PF won the plurality of 
votes in all but two of these (Bwacha and Livingstone). In 2008, 2011 and 2016, only Livingstone 
evaded the party. In 2006, 55.4% of the PF’s total votes came from these 28 constituencies, as 
compared to 19.3% for the MMD and 16.7% for the UPND. The PF’s dependence on urban votes 
decreased gradually at each subsequent election but still, in 2016, the UPND only won just over half 
as many urban votes as the PF (358,146 as against 691,494). One explanation might be that Sata’s 
campaign in 2006 was fondly remembered: a populist dog-whistle can be heard long after it is blown. 
That it did so as the party’s policy emphasis altered suggests that we need to look beyond policy to 
understand populism’s appeal. 
Populism as political theatre 
An alternative lens is provided by Ernesto Laclau (2005 among other contributions), who describes a 
populism he considers typical since the end of the Cold War. Laclau argues that a range of unrelated 
needs (for housing, employment rights, regional devolution, clean government, etc.) cannot any 
longer convincingly all be represented by a demand for state socialism. Populism is then a mode of 
articulation that aims to construct a ‘chain of equivalence’ between needs on the basis that they are 
all being frustrated by the same thing: a distant, technocratic and/or corrupt ‘power’. An antagonistic 
social identity of ‘the people’ can then be cohered through the shared attachment of diverse 
constituencies to an ‘empty signifier’, even simply the name of a politician. 
Resnick describes urban populations’ interests coalescing under a pre-existing common set of 
needs, and a resulting class awareness. This awareness might be grounded in hostility to the state, 
driven by what Karen Tranberg Hansen (2008) identifies as a long-running ‘war’ between informal 
street traders and the local authorities in Lusaka. Still, there are reasons to be sceptical that urban 
Zambians might self-identify primarily in class terms. The urban poor sometimes fight together, but 
also compete daily against each other, as market actors hustling for opportunities. This is not special 
to Zambia – a common feature of a contemporary crisis of representation is the difficulty politicians 
face reaching across the ‘void’ left by the retreat of the industrial  
 
 
 Figure 2. Votes cast for PF and UPND in Zambian presidential elections, 2006–2016 in districts with a 
population density over 100 persons per square kilometre. 
Source: ECZ 
List of constituencies: Chawama, Kabwata, Kanyama, Lusaka Central, Mandevu, Matero, Munali, Luanshya, Roan, Mufulira, 
Kantanshi, Kankoyo, Wusakile, Chimwemwe, Nkana, Kwacha, Kamfinsa, Chifubu, Ndola Central, Kabushi, Bwana Mkubwa, 
Kalulushi, Chingola, Nchanga, Chililabombwe, Livingstone, Kabwe Central, Bwacha. (2010 Census Population and Housing 
Preliminary Report. Vol 11, National Descriptive Tables, Central Statistics Office, Lusaka. Table 5). 
 
working class, mass political parties and trade unions (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2006). Populism is one 
means of trying to remake a connection between parties and voters whose livelihoods and 
communities are precarious. 
Larmer and Fraser (2007) argue that the PF’s 2006 campaign could be understood as populist in 
Laclau’s sense, because the PF promised to address multiple unrelated frustrations, in the name of a 
‘people’, whose consciousness of themselves was brought into being through the theatrical 
construction of an ‘internal boundary’ between people and power. The campaign itself turned their 
various needs into ‘fighting demands’ being made against a political enemy in the name of an empty 
signifier: Sata. 
Laclau insists that a populist signifier succeeds precisely when it is empty or universal enough to 
avoid any sense of favouritism among the disparate constituencies it pulls together. Nonetheless, 
‘emptiness’ is a difficult trick to pull off, and the term gives no clues as to the charismatic elements 
necessary to overcome incredulity about politicians in general. Seeking precision about the forms of 
signifier that work, Benjamin Moffitt demands we pay attention to ‘embodied, symbolically mediated 
performance’, and to the media stages on which populists appear (2016: 3). Based on a study of 28 
leaders (including Sata), Moffitt identifies three features that he claims characterise figures labelled as 
populist, but who offer varying policy pitches: an appeal to the people versus the elite; the 
deployment of bad manners to project rejection of the status quo; and the simultaneous production 
and exploitation of a sense of crisis or threat. 
Moffitt’s schema maps relatively well with Sata’s initial appeal. In 2006, locked out of state media, 
and ridiculed by The Post, Zambia’s main private newspaper, Sata sought unmediated communication 
with voters through call-in radio shows and campaign rallies. He jettisoned Zambian politicians’ typical 
claims to education, rhetorical sophistication, expert knowledge and deference to traditional and 
religious authority. Like other contemporary African leaders described as populist, Sata dressed casually, 
used local idioms, and was seen smoking and drinking (Hart, 2014). Sata’s brazen rudeness about his 
opponents was central to his charismatic appeal. Through his political style more than any policy 
platform, he communicated one message: ‘your anger at those in power is legitimate; I share it’ (Larmer 
and Fraser, 2007). 
It is not obvious that, in the world’s eighth most unequal country, Sata needed to produce a crisis 
(CIA, 2017). Nonetheless the PF’s campaign challenged urban social order. Sata’s celebrity increased 
as he faced down state authorities, enduring periodic imprisonment. During the 2006 campaign, PF 
supporters were equally combative, participating in riots, demonstrations and noisy assertions of a 
right to the streets. Inhabitants of Lusaka’s peripheral neighbourhoods appeared in the city centre, 
bouncing and singing on the roofs of minibuses. Cadres covered bus stations in party regalia, barred 
MMD supporters from trading and campaigning in ‘PF’ markets, and at one point succeeded in 
diverting the presidential motorcade. ‘Territorial’ behaviour defined the PF’s campaign. Chantal 
Mouffe (2005) points out that, in the deconstruction and reconstruction of antagonistic political 
identities – ‘us’ and ‘them’ – violence is often central. 
Patience Mususa (2010) has written about one aspect of Sata’s appeal that suggested his ability to 
exploit any crisis in urban Zambia: his promise to bring order. Sata contrasted state agencies’ 
corruption, waste and nepotism with nostalgic references to stability provided under the one-party 
state. Sata thus styled himself not merely as rude but tough, and as someone who ‘gets the job done’. 
He criticised lazy public servants and literally got his hands dirty picking up litter and inspecting 
work on road projects (for a Tanzanian comparison, Chachage, 2016; Collord, 2016). 
We can perhaps go further with the theatrical analogy that Moffitt evokes. Populist theatre does 
not simply involve politicians’ performing to passive, leader-worshipping masses. The bodies and 
voices of the audience are also brought on stage; ‘the people’ are encouraged to perform to 
themselves. The MMD’s campaigns featured commissioned jingles while the PF appropriated songs 
and dances from folk traditions and popular musicians that were familiar to, and easily performed 
by, the audience (Nchindila, 2008). Official party advertising, posters and slogans dominated the 
MMD’s campaign; homemade costumes and banners the PF’s. In 2006, Sata toured FM radio 
studios, hearing directly from callers discussing local politics. In response, he improvised policy on 
the hoof, amplifying and endorsing particular concerns, drawing more and more disparate issues into 
a chain of equivalence. It is in this sense that it is useful to describe the party’s 2006 campaign as 
populist. Because this was the only PF campaign of this type, it makes little sense to hold onto that 
description as the party’s style evolved. 
After the populist moment – in theory 
Theorists of populism have offered only tantalising hints about what might happen in the aftermath 
of a populist moment. For Francisco Panizza, it is ‘because it is impossible to erase the traces of the 
particular from the universal’ that identification with an empty signifier typically fails to produce 
durable political movements. Rather, populist mobilisation ‘generates a dialectic of aspiration, 
disappointment and grievances’ (2005: 28). Panizza suggests three ways in which this might play out. 
Firstly, populist mobilisation might succeed, such that a new political settlement emerges in which 
previously suppressed demands and identities are included. Alternatively, a new populism might 
outflank the original. Finally, Panizza argues, populism might run into the ground: having engaged 
and mobilised popular constituencies, their disappointment may deepen cynicism, resulting in a 
renewed crisis of representation or generating violent identarian politics. 
Laclau proposes two further alternatives. Firstly, it is possible for the ‘internal boundary’ (between 
‘people’ and ‘power’) to be reconfigured, such that an identical set of demands is turned to a 
completely different political project. Alternatively, where populists take power, some demands 
might be met, thus undermining the chain of equivalence, resulting in an attempt to remove the 
‘politics’ from populism (meaning its identification of an alternate future) such that each demand is 
isolated and can be engaged in the ‘normal’ technocratic manner. Laclau describes as especially 
common in post-colonial Africa, ‘delivery’ of some demands, combined with the repression of 
others and the authoritarian imposition of a discourse of national unity (2005: 47). This argument 
seems compatible with Panizza’s third option. The following sections suggest that something like 
this scenario has played out in Zambia over the last decade. 
After a populist moment – in Zambia 
Soon after the 2006 elections, Sata’s health deteriorated. When he had a heart attack in April 2008, 
President Mwanawasa approved a state-sponsored medical evacuation to South Africa. On his 
return, Sata advertised his humility, gratitude to Mwanawasa and reconciliation with the man he had 
mercilessly mocked in 2006. This attitude, appropriate to Zambian norms, turned out to be also 
strategically valuable when Mwanawasa died in August 2008 and politicians competed to embody the 
‘legacy’ of Zambia’s first dead president. His own frailty now made it implausible to present Sata as a 
strong man, available to the public and antagonistic to power. He presented a more sober image, 
emphasising his attachment to Catholic social teaching. Catholic NGOs and The Post newspaper, 
which had been highly critical of Sata in 2006, endorsed him, contrasting his ‘simplicity’ with 
corruption under new MMD leader, Rupiah Banda. 
In 2011, even though the PF’s image was softening, the incumbent MMD sought to pre-empt a 
repeat of the PF’s 2006 challenge. On the back of an economic boom, slick television and vast 
billboard advertising emphasised investment in health, education and road infrastructure. At rallies, 
audiences were fed, clothed and entertained by hired musicians as religious, traditional and political 
elites mingled on stage. The relationship being theatrically acted out reflected a patrimonial bargain: 
the incumbent delivers ‘development’ through subsidies and local big men before elections, and 
goods during it (the MMD went as far as to hand out large numbers of branded bicycles to their 
activists in 2011); to mark their gratitude and loyalty, beneficiaries attend the rallies, sing praises to all 
involved, and expect further benefits if they provide a healthy vote (for a Senegalese comparison, 
including a populist backlash, see Foucher, 2007). 
The MMD did not rely simply on marketing and patronage. Concerned that the PF would control 
urban space, they enlisted veteran political thug William Banda. Until he was eventually charged with 
assault, Banda targeted the same networks and territory that Sata had monopolised in 2006. ‘Call-
boys’, protected by police, physically prevented PF activists from accessing the taxi ranks, bus 
stations and markets, removing what few posters and flags they managed to display (Lusaka Times, 
2011). 
The PF’s response defined the 2011 campaign as again primarily theatrical. It declared that gifts 
distributed by the MMD were plundered from the public. Where it would normally be a disciplinable 
offence for party members to consort with their opponents, the PF announced that it was acceptable 
for supporters to attend MMD rallies and collect these goods, but that they should break with 
‘tradition’ and not sell their votes. The PF borrowed a slogan from a popular song; ‘Donchi Kubeba!’, 
meaning ‘Don’t tell them!’ (that you won’t be voting for the MMD). The song and a related dance 
became staples of PF campaign events (being reproduced in urban nightclubs and in goal 
celebrations for the national football team). An image of Sata holding a finger to his lips in a 
theatrical ‘hush!’, circulated during the campaign, was adopted by activists on the street. The people 
were constituted here by the Donchi Kubeba campaign not as a confrontational mass but as a silent 
majority with a shared desire to blindside the arrogant incumbents. 
The PF’s theatre was still themed on creating and policing a moral boundary between the people 
and power. However, the demands that Sata had put on the table in 2006 had been withdrawn. The 
PF’s figurehead was visibly flagging and significantly more polite. Its urban cadres were demobilised 
to avoid confrontation with Banda’s superior forces. The party’s residual messaging was close to a 
donor-friendly ‘good governance’ agenda: any idea that Sata represented a radical threat depended on 
memories of his performance in 2006 rather than any repeat of it. 
On taking power in 2011, the PF faced the challenge of meeting the hopes of both those inspired 
by Sata’s confrontational campaign in 2006 and those happier with the conciliatory positions 
adopted from 2008. The administration initially delivered policies that might please both, instituting 
a mining tax hike and a minimum wage, bumping up civil service pay, and promising to deliver a new 
constitution, media liberalisation and a crackdown on corruption. Sata’s first televised appearance as 
president, a stage-managed meeting with the Chinese ambassador, reflected the tensions that would 
inevitably have to be faced. Sata offered both assurances about the value of Chinese investment, and 
a thoroughly undiplomatic dressing down on the need for foreign investors to obey Zambian 
regulations. A wave of wildcat strikes on the Copperbelt in the first week of the administration 
pushed the contradictions. Strikes are almost impossible to declare legally in Zambia and the state 
had historically sided with mining companies who dismissed workers who challenged a one-sided 
collective bargaining arrangement. New Minister of Labour Chishimba Kambwili instead supported 
the right to strike and pressed the companies to settle, allowing workers to wring unprecedented pay 
hikes from firms unsure of their political standing. Nonetheless, the process had its limits. In 
February 2012, in what was one of his last confident moves, Sata responded to company concerns, 
criticised his ‘inexperienced’ Ministers and removed Kambwili’s portfolio (Lusaka Times, 2012). 
While the PF in office rejected labour militancy, it prioritised job creation, and launched a massive 
bond-financed road and infrastructure programme, which provided some short term cushion against 
a persistent weakening of the global copper price after 2011. Nonetheless, policy responses were 
inconsistent and investors delayed decisions in the face of political and policy uncertainty. 
The crisis that engulfed the administration almost immediately was not, however, primarily about 
the difficulties of pursuing policy reform, delivering on the highly contradictory PF platform or 
surviving adverse conditions in global markets. Sata’s health was visibly fading before the party took 
office. In power, the management of a parliamentary minority, and resulting inter and intra-party 
competition was all-consuming. In particular, the succession loomed. Even during Sata’s 2011 
presidential inauguration, a range of other PF figures – including Sylvia Masebo, Given Lubinda and 
Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba – used branded vehicles to label parts of the vast crowd as ‘theirs’, 
asserting their credentials as potential successors. Soon afterwards, rivals within the PF started to 
clash over the constitutionality of Guy Scott serving as vice president, given his European lineage, 
and over which minister should hold the instruments of power when the president was away for 
extended periods of medical care (Chan, 2013). 
PF Secretary General Wynter Kabimba sought in vain to institutionalise a party, which in its early 
years made a virtue of selling no cards (membership was ‘in the heart’), and to assert the secretariat’s 
control over candidate selection. Suspicions that Kabimba was aiming at the presidency were raised 
by his deployment of the PF machinery to suspend rivals Mwamba and Lubinda. In the ensuing 
battles, cadres paraded coffins (signifying the political death of their own party’s senior figures) 
outside State House, while Sata neither named a successor nor disciplined his bickering ministers. 
Having once depended on an image of openness and responsiveness to supporters and the media, 
and of casual dominance over his party, Sata was invisible, holding not so much as a press 
conference. Kabimba was eventually sacked, but Sata died relatively soon after, in October 2014, 
with none of the tensions in the party resolved. 
During the mourning period, acting President Guy Scott and new PF Secretary General Edgar 
Lungu both tried and failed to fire each other. Given Sata’s dominance over the party, there had 
never been a democratic PF convention and the procedures for finding a successor were unclear. 
Lungu’s supporters sought to avoid a vote of party members and to secure his candidacy through 
nominations from MPs or Ministers, while Scott held out for a democratic conference. Scott won 
that battle but lost the war. At the convention itself, cadres loyal to Lungu, protected by state 
security, beat supporters of other candidates and barred them from entry (Africa Confidential, 2014). 
The site was too dangerous for the acting Republican President and other candidates to attend, so 
they convened a counter-conference nearby. While Lungu won a show of hands in an uncontested 
election at one venue, Miles Sampa, Sata’s nephew, won a secret ballot at the other. Court cases 
proliferated, but, in an atmosphere of continuing violence and intimidation, none of the cases were 
resolved before the Scott/Sampa faction decided to ‘reconcile’ in the interests of national peace and 
Lungu was declared the PF’s de facto presidential candidate. 
In the 2015 presidential by-election Lungu sought to present himself as Sata’s anointed successor, 
and said he would honour Sata simply by serving out his term without pursuing any personal vision. 
Lungu ducked all televised presidential hustings (as he did again in 2016) and gave just two press 
conferences during his first term. In 2016, Lungu’s televised advertisements attempted to contrast 
his simple background, humility, faith, willingness to listen to (and pray with) others to resolve 
Zambia’s economic woes with UPND leader Hichilema’s business millions, alleged godlessness, and 
arrogance in asserting that he alone could ‘fix’ the economy. In terms of policy, little distinguished 
the candidates. 
Lungu’s styling fell short of anything we might sensibly describe as populist, although he was not 
bereft of sartorial dash, had a reputation as a drinker and was willing to sing and dance. Under the 
slogan ‘Sonta’ – meaning something like ‘point at something you have done’ – the PF campaign in 
2016 resembled more than anything the 2011 MMD campaign, advertising an incumbent who had 
‘delivered’ roads and infrastructure. The key difference was that Lungu’s brief first term was blighted 
by a collapse of the copper price, an unstable currency, inflation and a drought and related energy 
crisis featuring extended power outages. The PF came into the 2016 elections facing a widespread 
perception that it had mismanaged the economy and that, soon after the election, it would have to 
accept an IMF loan and an associated austerity programme. 
By 2016, the humiliations inflicted around the PF conferences had played themselves out. A 
majority of the senior figures who had contested the succession left the PF. Kabimba and Sampa 
launched their own parties. Sylvia Masebo, Sata’s wife Christine Kaseba and her stepson Mulenga 
Sata all stood as candidates for the UPND, as did Guy Scott’s wife Charlotte Harland. Scott and 
former Trade Minister Robert Sichinga publicly backed Hichilema while Mwamba became UPND 
Vice President. Most of these figures declared that their loyalty was to Sata, and that the PF under 
Lungu was unrecognisable. 
Nonetheless, the UPND offered little in the way of an inspirational alternative, and Lungu 
narrowly ‘won’ a disputed election that was criticised by international observers for the persecution 
of the opposition and free media, and for secretive management of a contested counting process. 
A democracy of chameleons 
One simple answer to the question, ‘how did the PF increase its vote share while its populism faded 
and died?’ is that it avoided a free and fair contest in 2016 (European Union, 2016).  
 
 Figure 3. Geographical distribution of constituencies by political party in Zambian 2016 Legislative Elections. 
Source: Lighton Phiri – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=52326581. 
 
However, to the extent that the PF vote share grew steadily after 2006, it is worth considering 
possible connections between populism and identity politics, and between populism and clientelism. 
Resnick (2013), Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2009), and Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) all adopt 
the term ‘ethno-populism’ in reference to the PF’s growing rural support after 2006 and the increasing 
regional concentrations of the PF vote in the north and the east of the country. Figure 3 shows a 
stark regional divide that had consolidated by 2016. 
This pattern is frequently described as reflecting the PF’s base in a Bemba–Nyanja ethnic alliance 
(facing a Tonga–Lozi alliance for the UPND). Nonetheless, authors using the term ethno-populism 
present scant evidence about campaign messaging. Indeed, Cheeseman and Larmer row back from 
their initial claim that the PF blended a populist urban discourse with an ethnically exclusive rural 
message, noting: ‘The particular emphasis in Sata’s electoral messages on populist and/or ethnic 
discourses may have varied at times according to his audience, but it was always designed to be 
ethnically inclusive and to stress national, rather than sectional, concerns’ (Cheeseman and Larmer, 
2015: 44). 
It may be that voters respond to information they glean about candidates or parties from their 
names or other ‘cues’ (Posner, 2005: 153). Nonetheless, in contemporary Zambia, the frequency 
with which candidates and leaders alter their affiliations complicates this task. As just described, a 
large share of the senior leadership of one party shifted to the other in 2016 such that the most 
prominent politician with a rural Northern hinterland and family connections to the  Bemba Royal 
Establishment, Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, was the UPND vice-presidential candidate. As with 
accounts of populism that boil down to noting the urban vote share, without further primary 
evidence, the designation ‘ethno-populism’ explains little about how the PF won votes in rural 
areas. 
One possible explanation of the PF’s ability to retain urban loyalties lies in the commonly 
identified link between populism and clientelism. Resnick notes that the (populist by some accounts) 
PRI in Mexico, ‘tried to create clientelistic links with new migrants in the city slums and informal 
workers by offering property titles, jobs, subsidized food and housing, and licenses for vending in 
flea markets’ (Resnick, 2013: 27). Nonetheless, she argues that while ‘vote buying’ is visible in 
Zambia, it is largely a practice of incumbent parties’ rural campaigns. In urban areas, she suggests, 
surveillance of clients or sanction for disloyalty would be impossible, given the limited presence of 
membership groups representing economic interests. 
Two points are worth making. Firstly, from 2006, when they won almost all urban local 
government elections, the PF became a form of incumbent power in the cities. Secondly, Zambia 
has an enduring urban culture of political organisation which may make surveillance and sanction 
imaginable. Under UNIP, alongside elected councillors, thousands of chairmen, secretaries and 
treasurers were elected as intermediaries between citizens and the party-state in residential units, 
agricultural co-operatives, market places, bus and taxi stands, trade unions, school councils and 
public works committees. These institutions atrophied and lost state sponsorship as Zambia 
liberalised in the 1990s. However, a bureaucratic/democratic culture, and a culture of self-
organisation persist in Zambia which we might discuss in terms of what Anne Pitcher and Kelly 
Askew (2006) describe as ‘post-socialism’. Local structures sometimes still provide a cadre of 
middlemen able to mobilise voters and connect them to political celebrities. They also often play a 
role in organising the distribution of everyday life opportunities (plots of land, market stalls and 
work) that Resnick describes as important in generating resentments. Clientelism, managed through 
micro-political structures in urban Zambia has played an important role in the ways that the PF has 
tried to ‘deliver’ to its constituents. Because these structures lack transparency and resources, they 
typically frustrate these hopes, generating a class of political activists full of resentment and ready to 
shift their allegiances (for a claim that similar dynamics fuels populism in South Africa, see Sitas, 
2008). 
Zambia’s ‘post-populist’ party political scene is not best seen then either through the lens of 
ethnic messaging and mobilisation or through that of programmatic marketing. Rather, a set of 
celebrity politicians sit atop networks of cadres loyal personally to them and who travel between 
parties seeking opportunities for collective political advancement. Harri Englund described a 
‘democracy of chameleons’ in late 1990s Malawi in which, while ‘floor-crossing’ was routinely 
condemned, it was also widely considered understandable that an aspirant politician, ‘frustrated’ in 
one party, might seek their fortune elsewhere (Englund, 2002). 
Former Vice-President Guy Scott’s account of his own (unsuccessful) attempt to reconcile with 
President Lungu after the 2015 elections suggests that senior political figures in Zambia understand 
their strategies and responsibilities this way: 
 
I told the President [Lungu] that if you want me back, allow all Sata’s people to come back. I went all the 
way to Western, North-Western, Copperbelt and I can’t just leave them. (quoted in Mataka, 2016). 
 
In the same interview, Scott reflected on how activists recruited to fight MMD cadres in 2011, 
became predatory on society, leaving gang warfare and protection rackets at the heart of the post-
populist settlement. 
 
My other condition was ‘get rid of violence’ […] I admit part of it is my fault because when I wanted 
William Banda out of Bauleni, I went and recruited people and say [sic] ‘can you protect the people in 
Bauleni’ but they themselves became thugs. I apologise, because they thought they were more powerful than 
police, so they started getting money from buses. (Mataka, 2016) 
 Figure 4. Share of registered voters casting ballots in Zambian presidential elections, 1991–2016. 
(* = 2008 and 2015 were presidential by-elections). 
Source: ECZ. 
 
Floor-crossing and protection rackets sit at the heart of a contemporary Zambian political scene that 
features strikingly little expectation that politicians represent the people. While the nature of 
‘presidential by-elections’, and the effects of voter registration exercises make comparisons 
imprecise, perhaps the single strongest measure of a resulting popular disillusion with politics has 
been the decline in voter turnout since 2006. 
Conclusion 
Zambia’s populist moment was centred on the vigorous personhood of Michael Sata. His claim to 
speak for the excluded legitimated a campaign defined not by its policy platform but a theatrical 
interaction with ‘the people’. The challenge to authority embodied in this participatory performance 
enthused Zambian voters, driving record turnout. Yet the moment was short-lived. The effects bear 
comparison with other cases, including that of Donald Trump in the United States. Precisely because 
populism is an improvised performance, often tinged with violence, it rarely stabilises. The chains of 
equivalence that bring together multiple particular demands are fragile. Spectacles required to build 
the celebrity of an empty signifier can undermine that figure’s credibility. Confrontations 
instrumental to the construction of social antagonisms simultaneously alienate. Campaigns built 
around a personality hostile to politics as normal may struggle to engage effectively the benefits of an 
institutionalised party political machine. If, in the face of these typical contradictions, populism can 
sustain long enough to lead to power, the daunting task of meeting the demands it legitimated 
looms. 
Other parts of this case are more contingent. Ill, and reconciled with Mwanawasa, Sata gave up 
his role as an energetic tribune of the people. Because it took power at local levels before winning 
nationally, the PF also lost its outsider status. Once in power nationally, the PF was constantly 
shaken by internal tensions, and struggled to manage less favourable economic circumstances at the 
end of the short metals boom of 2005–2011. In trying to deliver on a promise to provide jobs, the 
party re-introduced significant indebtedness and, by the time of the 2016 elections, the threat of a 
return to international superintendence of Zambian policy. Candidates for the 2016 election 
presented difficult to distinguish agendas and none of the remaining senior politicians display the 
charismatic talents that might enable them to become a new ‘empty signifier’ to the (still) 
marginalised. 
Yet we are not back to a technocratic square one. ‘Post-populist’ legacies are visible. Since the 
MMD’s Lusaka campaign in 2011, competition among uniformed ‘security details’ has become a 
normal part of an increasingly militarised intra-party culture. The deployment of brutal methods 
during the PF’s 2014 convention ended any sense that the party respected independent state 
institutions and gave a glimpse of how willing those around Lungu were to risk open conflict in 
order to secure their candidate. The 2016 campaign then witnessed unprecedented violence in a 
country that has prided itself on a peaceful political culture, resulting in the deaths of activists, and 
the suspension of campaign activities in two districts, including Lusaka, by the Electoral Commission 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2016). As this article goes to press UPND leader Hichilema 
languishes in jail on charges of treason resulting in part from a clash between the securitised 
motorcades of the two main party leaders. The cadres that surround these politicians represent not 
voluntary, enthusiastic public engagement in a future-oriented political project, but hired thugs 
defending authoritarian bosses. 
In Zambia’s populist moment, hyper-partisanship was already present. Through confrontational 
political theatre Michael Sata won enthusiastic public endorsement for the idea that partisanship was 
a necessary radical response to corruption and inequality. Its legacy is the instrumentalisation of 
political violence, voter and activist intimidation, the disruption of campaign activities and a diffuse 
abuse of presidential power (Wahman, 2017). There is little evidence that these activities engage the 
voters. In this sense, we might describe the Zambian scene as ‘post-populist’: politicians are still keen 
to try on populist costumes, but the people have increasingly left them alone and insecure on the 
stage. 
Funding 
This research was supported by ESRC/DFID grant #ES/J018945/1. 
References 
Africa Confidential (2014) Zambia: The PF picks two candidates, 55/24, available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article-preview/id/5865/The_PF_picks_two_candidates. 
Chachage, Chambi (2016) What Would Populist Tananians Do? Africa Blogging, available at: 
http://www.africablogging.org/what-would-populist-tanzanians-do/. 
Chan, Stephen (2013) Presidentialism and Vice Presidentialism in a Commonwealth Country: A cameo in 
Zambia. The Round Table 102(5): 431–44. 
Cheeseman, Nic, Robert Ford and Neo Simutanyi (2015) Is There a ‘Populist Threat’ in Zambia? In Paul 
Collier, Christopher Adam and Michael Gondwe (eds) Zambia: Building Prosperity from Resource Wealth.  Oxford 
University Press: 339–365. 
Cheeseman, Nic and Marja Hinfelaar (2009) Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian 
presidential election of 2008. African Affairs 109(434): 51–76. 
Cheeseman, Nic and Miles Larmer (2015) Ethnopopulism in Africa: Opposition mobilization in diverse and 
unequal societies. Democratization, 22(1): 22–50. 
CIA (2017) Country Comparison, Distribution of Family Income, Gini Index. The World Factbook, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html. 
Collord, Michaela (2016) Tanzania – President Magufuli’s first months in office. Presidential Power, available at: 
http://presidential-power.com/?p=4642. 
Electoral Commission of Zambia (2016) ECZ Suspends Campaigns in Lusaka and Nawala Districts. Press 
Release, 9 July. 
European Union (2016) EOM Zambia Preliminary Statement, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/election-
observation-missions/eom-zambia-2016/8250/eu-eom-zambia-preliminary-statement-2016_en. 
Englund, Harri (ed.) (2002) A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and culture in the New Malawi. Nordic Africa 
Institute. 
Foucher, Vincent (2007) Blue Marches: Public performance and political turnover in Senegal. In Julia C. Strauss 
and Donal B. Cruise O’Brien (eds) Staging Politics: Power and performance in Asia and Africa. London: IB Tauris: 
111–132. 
Fraser, Alastair (2016) Zambian Democracy: All heat, no light. Review of African Political Economy, available at: 
http://roape.net/2016/09/01/zambian-democracy-heat-no-light/. 
Fraser, Alastair and John Lungu (2007) For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s 
copper mines. CSTNZ. 
Hart, Gillian (2014) Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, populism, hegemony. University of Georgia Press. 
Hay, Colin (2007) Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Laclau, Ernesto (2005) Populism: What’s in a name? In Francisco Panizza (ed) Populism and the Mirror of 
Democracy. London: Verso. 
Larmer, Miles and Alastair Fraser (2007) Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist politics and Zambia’s 2006 
Election. African Affairs 106(425): 611–37. 
LeBas, Adrienne (2006) Polarization as Craft: Explaining party formation and state violence in Zimbabwe. 
Comparative Politics 38(4): 419–38. 
Lusaka Times (2011) Silvia Masebo Testifies in William Banda Case, available at: www.lusakatimes.com/ 
2011/12/09/silvia-masebo-testifies-william-banda-case/ 
Lusaka Times (2012) President Sata moves Labour portfolio to Ministry of Information and Broadcasting with 
Immediate Effect, available at: www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/03/president-sata-moves-labour-portfolio-
ministry-information-broadcasting-effect/ 
Lusaka Times (2016) HH Promises to Revive All Dormant Industries in Livingstone Once Elected, available at: 
www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/27/hh-promises-revive-dormant-industries-livingstone-elected. 
Mair, Peter (2006) Ruling the Void? New Left Review 42(43): 25–51. 
Mataka, Kombe (2016) Scott Explains His Support for UPND. The Post, 2 April. 
Mkandawire, Thandika (1999) Crisis Management and the Making of ‘Choiceless Democracies’ in Africa. In 
Richard Joseph (eds) The State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rynner Publishers: 119-136. 
Moffitt, Benjamin (2016) The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University 
Press. 
Mouffe, Chantal (2005) On the Political. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Mususa, Patience (2010) ‘Getting By’: Life on the copperbelt after the privatisation of the Zambia consolidated 
copper mines. Social Dynamics 36(2): 380–394. 
Nchindila, Bernard Mwansa (2008) Honest by Chance: An investigation into Bemba music in Zambian politics. 
Muziki: Journal of Music Research in Africa, 5(2): 298–322. 
Panizza, Francisco (2005) Introduction. In Francisco Panizza (ed) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. London: 
Verso: 1-31. 
Patriotic Front (2006) Patriotic Front Manifesto. Lusaka, Zambia. 
Pitcher, M Anne and Kelly M Askew (2006) African Socialisms and Postsocialisms. Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 76(1): 1–14. 
Posner, Daniel N (2005) Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge University Press. 
Resnick, Danielle (2013) Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies. Cambridge University Press. 
Simutanyi, Neo, Alastair Fraser and Nalukui Milapo (2015) Background Paper: Politics and Interactive Media in 
Zambia. PIMA Working Paper, University of Cambridge. 
Sitas, Ari (2008) Populism and Politics in KwaZulu-Natal, Transformation, 66. 
Tranberg Hansen, Karen (2008) The Informalization Of Lusaka’s Economy: Regime change, ultra modern 
markets, and street vending, 1972–2004. In Jan-Bart Gewald and Marja Hinfelaar (eds) One Zambia, Many 
Histories. Leiden: Brill: 213-240. 
UPND (2006) Hakainde Hichilema for President, ‘HH’ The Man. UDA full-page advert in The Post, 27 
September. 
UPND (2016) UPND’s 10 Point Plan for Zambia. Available at: http://hh-zambia.com/hhs-10-point-plan-for-
zambia/. 
Wahman, Michael (2017) A Zambian Opposition Leader was Arrested, but there are Deeper Cracks in the 
Country’s Democracy, The Washington Post, 18 May. 
 
